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Invariance: A Tale of Intellectual Migration
Abstract

The plotline of the standard story told about the development of intellectual history at the end of the 19th/
turn of the 20th century follows the move from absolutism to perspectivalism. The narrative takes us, on the
one hand, from the scientism of late Enlightenment writers like Voltaire, Mill, D’Alebert, and Comte and the
historical determinism of Hegel, all of which were based upon a universal picture of rationality, to, on the
other hand, the relativistic physics of Einstein, the perspectival art of Picasso, and the individualism of
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard leading to the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger to and on through the
deconstructivist work of Derrida in which universal proclamations were deemed meaningless. In their place,
was relative dependent upon subjective, political, and social factors, influences, and interpretations. Like all
sketches, of course, the story is more complicated than that.
There is another trend in the intellectual air of the early 20th century that gets left out of this oversimplified
picture, one that threads a middle path between absolutism and perspectivalism, a path that considers both
frame-dependent or covariant truths and frame-independent or invariant truths and examines the relations
between them. Indeed, the notions of covariance and invariance play important roles in the development of
the fields of mathematics, physics, philosophy, and psychology in the decades after the turn of the 20th
century.
The migration of the concepts of invariance and covariance illustrates not only the interconnectedness of the
working communities of intellectuals, but also displays ways in which the personal, social, and political
overlaps between groups of disciplinary thinkers are essential conduits for the conceptual cross-fertilization
that aids in the health of our modern fields of study. [excerpt]
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T

he plotline of the standard story told about the development of intellectual
history at the end of the 19th/turn of the 20th century follows the move
from absolutism to perspectivalism. The narrative takes us, on the one hand,
from the scientism of late Enlightenment writers like Voltaire, Mill, D’Alebert, and
Comte and the historical determinism of Hegel, all of which were based upon a
universal picture of rationality, to, on the other hand, the relativistic physics of
Einstein, the perspectival art of Picasso, and the individualism of Nietzsche and
Kierkegaard leading to the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger to and on
through the deconstructivist work of Derrida in which universal proclamations were
deemed meaningless. In their place, was relative dependent upon subjective, political,
and social factors, influences, and interpretations. Like all sketches, of course, the
story is more complicated than that.
There is another trend in the intellectual air of the early 20th century that gets left
out of this oversimplified picture, one that threads a middle path between absolutism
and perspectivalism, a path that considers both frame-dependent or covariant truths
and frame-independent or invariant truths and examines the relations between
them. Indeed, the notions of covariance and invariance play important roles in the
development of the fields of mathematics, physics, philosophy, and psychology in the
decades after the turn of the 20th century.
The migration of the concepts of invariance and covariance illustrates not
only the interconnectedness of the working communities of intellectuals, but also
displays ways in which the personal, social, and political overlaps between groups of
disciplinary thinkers are essential conduits for the conceptual cross-fertilization that
aids in the health of our modern fields of study.
Late 19th Century Algebra and the Introduction of Covariance and
Invariance
The theory of invariants is invariably associated with the famed British
mathematical pair Arthur Cayley and J.J. Sylvester, who developed the theory while
working as lawyers. Both displayed great talent for mathematics while young, yet
both ended up in law because the British professorate at the time required Anglican
priesthood. This line was not available to Sylvester, who was Jewish, and was refused
by Cayley who, while an orthodox Anglican of undeniable faith, did not feel a call
to the priesthood and so could not in god conscience take Holy Orders for mere
personal advantage.1
This sense of earnestness was a trait Cayley displayed through all of his life.
Sylvester, on the other hand, was a man in search of what he deemed to be legitimate
recognition for a mind of his outstanding caliber and this led him to fight vigorously
whenever he felt he had been slighted in personal or intellectual matters,2 even trivially
so, and to work on open mathematical problems of massive historical significance.3
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Sylvester’s fire to Cayley’s ice allowed the pair to work fruitfully on problems across
the mathematical spectrum, but the place where their efforts had the most impact was
in the field of algebra.
Algebraists in the 19th century were studying the way the forms of equations
changed under transformation of variables. Equations posit relations between
quantities. These quantities are written in terms of coordinates that are freely chosen
linguistic conventions. Some choice of coordinates must be made in order to have a
language in which to express the relations. The variables themselves are meaningless
empty names, but once a coordinate frame is selected, one may meaningfully make
statements about relations between them. You can translate these relations between
choices of coordinates, just as one may translate the sentence “Snow is cold” into
German or French, but some language is needed and this requires a choice of
coordinates. Certain choices may make particular calculations easier than others,
and so it is often advantageous to transform the equations by replacing one variable
selection with another, but ultimately it is a completely free choice what coordinates
are invoked.
The French mathematicians Joseph-Louis Lagrange and Pierre-Simon Laplace,
the Germans Friedrich Gauss and Gotthold Eisenstein, and the Englishman George
Boole had all investigated interesting cases in which, for certain classes of equations,
certain properties of the structure of the equations and their solutions remained the
same before and after transforming their variables by choosing different coordinate
systems. Cayley termed these unchanging properties, “hyperdeterminants,” but
Sylvester – who wrote of himself, “Perhaps I may without immodesty lay claim to
the appellation of the Mathematical Adam, as I believe that I have given more names
(passed into general circulation) to the creatures of the mathematical reason than
all other mathematicians of the age combined”4 – coined a new name for them,
“invariants.”
Upon reading Boole’s paper of 1841, “Exposition of a General Theory of Linear
Transformations,” Cayley became fascinated with the notion of invariants and began
a correspondence with Boole in which he became determined to ferret out all the
invariants of the binary quadratic and binary quintic forms and, more importantly,
to find a systematic way of accounting for them. Some invariants, it turned out were
special cases of more general invariants, and Cayley was determined to find the
complete basis set of these invariants, that is the smallest set of invariants that could
be used to construct all possible invariants associated with those forms of equations.
Cayley and Sylvester worked on this problem throughout their lives, but they made
their historic strides in the 1840s and 1850s, giving rise to invariant theory in the form
we know it today.
Once they had begun their great work in earnest, Cayley came to realize that
their new theory of invariants was not just a curiosity of certain algebraic equations.
Rather, it had a deeper meaning.
This idea of ‘permanence among change’ has been such a recurring
idea in religious, philosophic, and scientific thought that it’s explicit
appearance in mathematics would have acted as a magnet to the
42
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young mathematician on the lookout for new subjects. Had he not
assimilated the Platonic vision of scientific research as taught at
King’s College, London? Classics, supervised by R. W. Browne at
King’s, taught that Plato’s interpretation of the object of science as
the search for ‘the true, the eternal, the immutable” was the correct
vision and that to succeed in this cause ‘is to know intellectually the
essence of things absolutely.’5
Not only did invariants expose something meaningful within algebra, but it was a
Platonic tool to be used to revolutionize fields throughout mathematics.
The Migration of Invariance into 19th/20th Century Geometry
When meeting Felix Klein, one
could not have avoided being impressed. Klein was a tall, handsome,
dark haired and dark bearded man with shining eyes, whose
mathematical lectures were universally admired and circulated even
as far as America.6
Widely considered second only to the great Henri Poincaré as the most important
mathematical mind in the first half of the 20th century, it could be said of Klein,
like Cayley, that “his mathematical interest was all-inclusive. Geometry, number
theory, group theory, invariant theory, algebra.”7 Also, like Cayley, he was one to draw
connections between the seemingly distinct mathematical subfields.
Traditionally, mathematics had two seemingly distinct areas of study: algebra and
geometry. By the time Cayley was helping to revolutionize algebra, geometry had
already commenced a radical transformation. Ivan Lobachevski’s created hyperbolic
geometry, a new geometric system whose basic axioms were inconsistent with those
of Euclid, whose work The Elements had shaped the field since classical times and
were thought by the greatest minds of history to be unassailable. Lobachevski’s work
struck at the core of confidence in mathematical truth. Mathematics, it was held,
was the one place where definite knowledge was available to humans. From Plato
to Descartes, mathematics, particularly the rigorous proofs of Euclidean geometry,
provided the model for the finished state of all other human intellectual endeavors.
But the specter of a competitor to Euclid meant that perhaps the certainty that was
attributed to geometry could not be counted upon. If we could not fall back on
Euclid for certainty, then perhaps nothing at all was certain. But this seemed absurd.
As absurd as Lobachevski’s new geometric system. In the space Lobachevski
describes, it is impossible to have figures of different sizes with the same internal
angles. There could be no rectangles. The internal angles of a triangle were always less
than two right angles. It all seemed so bizarre, so counter to our most basic intuitions
and so surely had to be false. In mathematics, that means that it would have to give
rise to a contradiction. But while more and more fantastic theorems could be derived,
no inconsistency arose. The search continued on for if even a single contradiction
could be shown to follow from the axiom set of this new geometry, then it could be
rejected wholesale, the supremacy of Euclid reestablished, and the basis for belief in
classical thought reasserted with complete confidence. All hopes for rescuing the old
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order rested on this hope.
But Klein, along with Poincaré and Eugeno Beltrami, showed that the superiority
of Euclid could never be established. Klein gave the basic geometric terms new
meanings and showed that Lobachevski’s axioms, when understood in this new,
non-standard fashion, were true of a set of Euclidean objects. Since a sentence is a
contradiction by virtue of its form (the sentence “I have a blim and I don’t have a blim”
is false no matter what I decide to mean by the word “blim”), by cleverly translating
the non-Euclidean axioms into the Euclidean language so that the reinterpreted nonEuclidean axioms became deductively necessary results of Euclid’s own system, Klein
demonstrated that the only way Lobachevski’s axioms could imply a contraction is if
the Euclidean axioms also implied a contraction. No one wanted to say that Euclid
was flawed, so on the basis of this relative consistency proof, no one could not say
that the non-Euclidean geometry was flawed either.
But Lobachevski’s system was not the only new geometry. Indeed, geometric
systems proliferated at a stunning rate. More conservative geometers refused to even
consider such studies geometry. Klein, to his detriment, did not belong to such a
group.
[Klein] was much younger than his colleagues, and they resented
his innovating tendencies. In particular, there was opposition to his
determination to avail himself of the vaunted German ‘Lehrfreiheit,’
and to interpret the word “Geometry” in its widest sense.8
Klein embraced the non-standard geometries, but this proliferation came
with a cost, the field lost its elegance and that is a property mathematicians revere.
Something had to be done to tame the wildness emerging in geometry, to bring order
and structure to the multiplicity of systems. The concept that could be used to do the
job was invariance and it was Cayley himself who first realized it.
Among the more abstract systems to arise was projective geometry. Think of
trying to make a flat map out of a globe. To do this, the landmasses on the globe would
have to be projected onto a flat screen and traced out. But in this tracing process, the
move from the curved surface of the globe to the flat surface of the screen would
distort size, shape, and angles – consider, for example the way that countries far
from the equator, like Greenland, are significantly larger on the standard Mercator
projection maps than they ought to be. Size in such a projection is not invariant.
But there are geometric relations that do remain invariant and Cayley realized that
these relations form what mathematicians call a group, that is, it is a closed set with
an operator that when applied to any member of the set will point you to another
member of the set.
Klein first read of Cayley’s work in George Salmon’s textbooks9 that were widely
translated and were one of the major routes through which English mathematics was
channeled to the Continent. Salmon had been a friend and constant correspondent
of Cayley and Sylvester and his four careful, detailed textbooks were well-studied and
appreciated in his time. Cayley’s application of invariant theory coupled with group
theory had opened a door to understanding geometry in a much broader sense, but
the intellectually conservative Cayley refused to admit what was in the room behind it.
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He denied the legitimacy of the new geometric systems, even though he realized that
in some way invariant theory would allow us to make sense of them.
Klein, on the other hand, had no such problem and when he received his first
significant academic post at the university in Erlangen, he used the occasion of his
inaugural lecture to set out what became known as the Erlangen Programm, the project
of accounting for the interrelatedness of all geometric systems in terms of associated
groups and invariants. If one system had a group of invariants that was a subgroup of
the invariants of another system, one could see the relation between the two.
Klein continued to expand his work in this direction through his positions at
Erlangen, Munich, Leipzig, and ultimately Göttingen, a beautiful, pastoral university
that he transformed into the mathematical Mecca. But this work was not done in
isolation.
In looking through Klein’s Autobiography, one is struck by his
consistent references to his friendships. It was characteristic of
him that they all bore directly, or indirectly, on his mathematical
development and on his power of organization. He was indeed
a man without a hobby; in particular, and this is curious and
interesting from a psychological point of view, although a German,
and although endowed with an excessive acuteness of hearing, he
could not distinguish one tune from another.
Social intercourse for Klein meant the interchange of ideas, and
for that he was as eager as the ancient Athenians. It was in such giveand-take that his own conceptions took form. There is, perhaps, no
contradiction in saying that Klein was never the originator of his
own ideas. He had not the generating force of a Cauchy or a Georg
Cantor, but he had a phenomenal power of grasping the import of
a suggestion, and working it out on a grander scale than any before
him had imagined.10
Klein was a social thinker who depended on interaction to cross-pollinate his thoughts.
One such occasion was afforded when Klein was in Munich and Cayley, with whom
he had been corresponding, spent the three months of the summer of 1880 visiting
the Kleins.
While Cayley never accepted the breadth of Klein’s geometric work, the result –
now called Cayley-Klein geometry – shaped and structured the way the field advanced.
The notion of invariance became an essential mathematical tool beyond its algebraic
origins.
Invariance and the Theory of Special Relativity
Klein had a bright young student named Adolf Hurwitz who followed him from
Munich to Leipzig where he received his Ph.D. under Klein and ultimately secured a
university post at Königsberg, an isolated country outpost in the German academy,
but a pleasant place with a long and treasured intellectual history.
Here, he found himself with a pair of young, but very inspired and incredibly
talented students. One, David Hilbert, would go on to be one of the most famed
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minds in the history of mathematics and would be the co-discoverer of the general
theory of relativity, developing it at the same time – although along a different
methodological path – as Albert Einstein. The other, Hermann Minkowski, would
also work in both pure mathematics and mathematical physics.
While Hilbert was an out-going, social person who loved dancehall music and was
an interminable flirt, his dear and life-long friend Minkowski was bookish and shy.
Minkowski’s family was Russian Jewish and had moved west to Königsberg because of
the oppression of Jews under the Czar. It was an experience that shaped Minkowski.
After having to sell all of the family’s possessions, including their books, Minkowski
memorized the works of Goethe so that should he again end up without books, he
would never be without literature.11 Hilbert’s mind, like his personality, was broad and
explosive, while Minkowski was much more rigorous and thorough. The three would
meet regularly under an apple tree near the university and take long walks arguing and
exploring topics and open questions covering the entire span of mathematics.
Hilbert’s doctoral dissertation topic was an extension of Cayley’s theory of
invariants and a copy was sent to Minkowski who responded,
I studied your work with great interest, and rejoiced over all the
processes which the poor invariants had to pass through before they
managed to disappear. I would not have supposed that such a good
mathematical theorem could have been obtained in Königsberg!12
It would be Minkowski, though, who would use invariant theory to make his greatest
contribution.
They complimented each other and corresponded whenever they were separated.
As Hilbert climbed the ladder of the German academy, moving to ever more
prestigious positions, he always made sure to use his leverage to pull Minkowski into
the newly vacated position. This continued until Minkowski left the German system
and took a position at the Eidgenössische Technishe Hochschule in Zürich where he
was to have his most famous student, Einstein.
The relationship between Minkowski and the young Einstein was not a pleasant
one. In the classroom, Minkowski’s shyness led him to speak quietly in a halting
and stammering fashion. His pedagogical flaws led Einstein, who needed little
reason, to skip many of Minkowski’s lectures, relying upon the notes of his friend
and classmate Marcel Grossman without whom he likely would not have made it
through his university exams. Minkowski thought Einstein arrogant, impudent, and
insufficiently serious, referring to him as a lazy dog. Einstein did not think any better
of his professor Minkowski at the time although he was later to list him among his
“excellent teachers” at the ETH.13
Einstein did graduate from the ETH, but his poor relationship with his professors
left him without a job as an assistant despite great effort and years of trying. It would
be virtually assumed that a graduate from this prestigious school, with well-connected
faculty would naturally take the next step along the career path of a developing
scientist, but Einstein, because of his attitude as a student was denied. Instead,
Grossman again saved him when his father secured him a position as a patent clerk, a
respectable civil service job. He was working this job in the miraculous year of 1905,
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when Einstein wrote his famous “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies,” the
paper that introduced the special theory of relativity to the world.
The work begins in a curious fashion, considering two thought experiments. In
the first, a magnet is held still and a wire coil around it, while connected to a circuit,
is moved back and forth. This gives rise to an induction current. Next, the coil is held
still while the magnet is moved back and forth in the same way inside of it, giving rise
to an equivalent current. Under the old theory, Maxwell’s electrodynamics with a field
bearing, but invisible ether, the two received different physical explanations.
Take, for example, the reciprocal electrodynamic action of a magnet
and a conductor. The observable phenomenon here depends only
on the relative motion of the conductor and the magnet, whereas
the customary view draws a sharp distinction between the two cases
in which either the one or the other of these bodies is in motion.
For if the magnet is in motion and the conductor at rest, there arises
in the neighborhood of the magnet an electric field with a certain
definite energy, producing a current at the places where parts of
the conductor are situated. But if the magnet is stationary and the
conductor in motion, no electric field arises in the neighborhood of
the magnet. In the conductor, however, we find an electromotive
force, to which in itself there is no corresponding energy, but which
gives rise – assuming equality of relative motion in the two cases
discussed – to electric currents of the same path and intensity as
those produced by the electric forces in the former case.14
From this equivalence, that is, from the invariance of the hypothetically measured
electrical current in the circuit, Einstein argues that the invisible ether, a significant
metaphysical postulation by advocates of classical physics, in fact does not exist.
Examples of this sort, together with the unsuccessful attempts to
discover any motion of the earth relatively to the ‘light medium,’
suggest that the phenomena of electrodynamics as well as mechanics
possess no properties corresponding to the idea of absolute rest.
They suggest rather that, as has already been shown to the first order
of small quantities, the same laws of electrodynamics and optics
will be valid for all frames of reference for which the equations
of mechanics hold good…The introduction of a ‘luminiferous
ether’ will prove to be superfluous inasmuch as the view here to be
developed will not require an ‘absolutely stationary space’ provided
with special properties.15
Einstein employs Cayley’s concept of invariance under transformation here, except
that instead of a mathematical entity maintaining its form under transformation of
coordinates, it is a physical measurement maintaining its numerical value under a
change of reference frame. The concept of invariance is key to the very notion of
relativity.
While Einstein’s ideas were revolutionary, not many paid attention to them.
Challenging Isaac Newton’s theory of mechanics which was the best confirmed
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scientific theory in history, standing unchallenged for three centuries was audacious
enough, but to replace it with a theory so peculiar, such an affront to common sense,
led many to think it a complete non-starter. The theory claimed that there was no
fact in the world about the simultaneity of spatially separated events. It claimed that
moving objects would be shorter in moving frames of reference than they were in
frames attached to the objects. Einstein argued that the length of time passing depends
upon your state of motion. It was a bizarre theory challenging the heart of classical
physics as proposed by a nobody and most physicists would have none of it.
But there was one who did see the insight, the genius, the completely revolutionary
nature of the theory – Hermann Minkowski, who commented about the theory, “Oh,
that Einstein, always missing lectures – I really would not have thought him capable
of it!”16 Minkowski saw in Einstein’s work a new picture of the world that was not
completely seen at the time by anyone else, including Einstein himself because of
the sort of mathematical language in which the theory was worked out. “Einstein’s
presentation of his deep theory is mathematically awkward – I can say that because
he got his mathematical education from me at Zürich,”17 Minkowski was known to
comment having joined Hilbert and Klein at Göttingen.
In an address entitled “Space and Time” delivered to the 80th Assembly of
German Natural Scientists and Physicians in 1908 at Cologne, he expressed Einstein’s
theory in an entirely novel way. Einstein writes,
Minkowski’s important contribution to the theory lies in the
following: Before Minkowski’s investigation it was necessary to carry
out a Lorentz-transformation on a law in order to test its invariance
under such transformations; he, on the other hand, succeeded in
introducing a formalism such that the mathematical form of the law
itself guarantees its invariance under Lorentz-transformations.18
This understates the case a bit. This formalism used by Minkowski takes the geometric
work of Cayley and Klein and “geometrizes” the theory of relativity, that is, it shows
how the theory forces us into a fundamentally new understanding of the universe as
a four-dimensional integrated picture of space and time.
Minkowski begins the address with his famed passage,
The views of space and time which I wish to lay before you have
sprung from the soil of experimental physics, and therein lays their
strength. They are radical. Henceforth, space by itself, and time by
itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind
of union of the two will preserve an independent reality.19
It is clear that there is more than a new formalism here, more than simply a clearer
linguistic framing, rather, there is a new way to understand the structure of the
universe itself.
We must think of the world in which we live as a combination of three spatial
dimensions and a fourth temporal dimension combined together. The points of this
world are events, that is, places at a time. Objects in this space-time are like tubes
flowing through it. Any slice along that tube is the object at a given time. The trail of
its tube is its world-line through space-time.
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Attached to each event is a light cone in the future pointing direction and one in
the past pointing direction. It is called a light cone because it is formed by considering
all of the points in space-time that could be reached by a signal moving at the speed
of light from or to that point. Since no signal can travel faster than the speed of light,
the points inside of the past pointing light cone are the set of all events that could
causally effect the point, that is, the set of events in the past pointing light cone of
an event contains everything about the universe that it is possible for someone at that
point in space at that time to know and everything in the universe that could have any
effect at all on that event. If an event is outside of the light cone, someone at that
point could have no knowledge of it and it could in no way influence it. Similarly, the
future pointing light cone contains all of the events in the universe that this event
could have any effect upon. If an event is outside of the future pointing light cone,
the original event cannot be causally related to it and an observer at that point could
have no knowledge of the original event.
More than a formalism, what Minkowski provides for special relativity is a
complete worldview, a metaphysic, a new image of the nature of reality itself. It was
the use of the Cayley-Klein approach to geometry on Einstein’s clumsily formulated
mathematics that changed the way we see space and time.
General Covariance and the General Theory of Relativity
Minkowski’s work completely changed the way Einstein himself understood his
own theory. As he thought about the malleable space-time Minkowski sketched from
his work, Einstein came to find two flaws. First, while the theory included aspects of
mechanics, optics, electricity and magnetism, there was one physical force that was
nowhere to be found – gravitation. The theory would have to be expanded. Second
and more related to Minkowski, the invariant quantities Minkowski points out only
remain invariant in a special set of reference frames, those that move in straight lines
at a constant speed relative to each other. These covariant frames are called “inertial
frames” and the laws of the theory held good only for them. This limitation bothered
Einstein who thought that the laws of physics should be the same for all observers.
In contrast to [the limited invariance of the special theory of relativity]
we wish to understand by the ‘general principle of relativity’ the
following statement: All bodies of reference K, K’, etc., are equivalent
for the description of natural phenomena (formulation of the general
laws of nature), whatever may be their state of motion.20
This limitation of the theory to the special case of inertial reference frames is why
the theory is called “special relativity.” Einstein wanted to make the theory universal,
to make the governing physical equations of a relativistic gravitation theory hold for
all possible observers, that is, to create a general theory of relativity, not just one for
special reference frames.
Just as his 1905 paper began with a thought experiment in which two cases were
seen to be different accounts of the same phenomenon, so too with his 1916 paper
introducing the general theory of relativity. Consider the counter-intuitive fact that
heavier things do not fall faster. This is a strange and unique aspect to gravitation. If
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you have two charged bodies and you double the charge on one, then you double the
acceleration due to the resulting electrical force. It is the same with magnetic force.
But if you double the mass, that is, the gravitational charge, you do not double the
acceleration due to gravity.
Suppose you were in an elevator with a bathroom scale sitting still on the bottom
floor of a tall office building. Stepping on the scale, it would read your normal weight.
This is because your weight is pushing down on the top of the scale, the floor is not
letting the scale move, thereby compressing the springs within to a certain degree.
Now, the elevator begins to moves upward. What happens? Your weight is still
pressing down in the same way, but now the upwardly accelerating floor is pressing
up more than it was. As a result, the displayed weight increases. At the top floor of
the building, the unthinkable happens, the cable snaps and you plummet downward
in gravitational freefall. In your last seconds, you look down at the scale to see it reads
zero. You are still pushing down in the same fashion, but now the floor is accelerating
downward at the same rate, meaning it is not pushing back, so the springs cannot
compress, and the scale reads zero.
Now suppose you were in a small spacecraft with a bathroom scale far away from
anything so that there is no gravity. You step on the scale and it reads zero. Now
suppose the spacecraft fires its engines so that it accelerates upward. The pressing of
the spacecraft’s floor and your mass against the top and bottom of the scale compress
the spring and your weight is given. If the spacecraft accelerated at 9.8 meters per
second each second, what would the scale read? Your weight on Earth.
So, if you woke up to find yourself in a small room with nothing but a bathroom
scale, could you figure out if you were in a non-accelerating reference frame in a
gravitational field, in an accelerating spaceship in a gravity-free region, or some
combination? No. No matter what the result, it could be equally well explained in
either way. Not only that, but notice that if we tried to explain it as acceleration, then
everything around you, no matter how much mass it has, would have to be held to
have the same acceleration. But this is exactly what we want. Einstein could now argue
that gravitation and acceleration were just different descriptions of the same thing.
But someone accelerating would “see” the light cones of events shifted at an
angle compared to those at rest with respect to them. If acceleration and gravitation
are equivalent descriptions, then gravitation should skew the light cones, but this is the
same thing as warping space-time itself, that is, gravitation would bend the universe.
This was the big insight. Einstein now just had to find the equations that described
the geometry of the universe for any given distribution of matter and energy. To be
successful, they had to satisfy two conditions – they had to be generally covariant, that
is, keep the invariants the same regardless of the frame of reference, and they had
to satisfy a criterion of uniqueness (Eindeutigkeit), that is, they had to give a unique
value for the strength of the gravitational field at every point. The equations had to
hold for all observers and for each one provide a fixed value for the field strength for
each point in space-time.
Marcel Grossman once again coming to the rescue and helping Einstein acquire
an understanding of the new tensor calculus, a more powerful mathematics needed for
50
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the project, he began to work. As he progressed, he reached a point where the project
was promising. But then, he hit a snag. Einstein realized that he had field equations
that were generally covariant, but they permitted him to do something strange. He
could take a small region of space-time that was devoid of masses, he referred to such
an empty region as a “hole,” and twist the field values for the geometry of space in
the hole in arbitrary ways. This meant that within the hole, the field equations would
not uniquely nail down the physical values for the curvature of space-time. He could
easily fix this, but it would cost him general covariance. If he wanted to save what
Minkowski gave him in the extension of the theory, it seemed he would have to
surrender the ability to give a complete and unique description of reality. But such a
complete and unique description is the very point of a scientific theory. What to do?
Einstein struggled with this “hole problem” from late 1913 through 1915.21 The
original field equations seemed right, but they meant that he could not have both
general covariance and uniqueness so they could not be right. He took the physics in
several different directions, trying to avoid the problem. Ultimately, Einstein realized
that it was not a problem of the physics, rather it was a philosophical problem; the
trouble came not from the field equations, but from his interpretation of them. He
was taking the values of the metric field, the curvature of space-time to be a real
thing. But, after all, it was a hole, a region where there was nothing to be altered.
It was a difference that made no difference. If he considered the different values
in the hole to just be different descriptions of the same reality, the reality made up
of coincidences, that is, events which lie at the intersection of world lines (in other
words, actual interactions among things), then he would have a theory that described
the world in a way that would work for all possible observers.
Einstein sets this out in what is called the “point-coincidence argument” in his
1916 paper “The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity.”
The general laws of nature are to be expressed by equations which
hold good for all systems of co-ordinates, that is, are co-variant with
respect to any substitutions whatever (generally co-variant).
It is clear that a physical theory which satisfies this postulate
will also be suitable for the general postulate of relativity…That
this requirement of general co-variance takes away from space and
time the last remnant of physical objectivity, is a natural one, will be
seen from the following reflexion. All our space-time verifications
invariably amount to a determination of space-time coincidences.
If, for example, events consisted merely in the motion of material
points, then ultimately nothing would be observable but the meetings
of two or more of these points. Moreover, the results of our
measurings are nothing but verifications of such meetings of the
material points of our measuring instruments with other material
points, coincidences between the hands of a clock and points on the
clock dial, and observed point-events happening at the same place
at the same time.
The introduction of a system of reference serves no other
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purpose than to facilitate the description of the totality of such
coincidences…22
What is real, Einstein argues is what is observationally verifiable, and what is verifiable
are the interactions of things, the coincidences of world lines. That this line of
reasoning, key to the understanding of the general theory of relativity was a claim
about the nature of knowledge was not a fact that would escape the philosophical
community for long.
Invariance and Uniqueness in Philosophy
When Einstein gave his first graduate seminar on the general theory of relativity at
the University of Berlin in 1919, there were five attendees. One was Hans Reichenbach,
a philosopher.
Reichenbach had been an engineer before writing a doctoral dissertation in the
philosophy of physics, a field that did not exist at the time. His readers included a
physicist who did not understand the philosophy and a philosopher who did not
understand the mathematics or physics. When he had a chance as a newly minted
Ph.D. to take Einstein’s seminar, he jumped at the chance and the two would become
friends and ultimately colleagues.
Reichenbach was quick to understand that the theory of relativity did not only
overturn core beliefs in physics, but also in philosophy. The philosophical world at
the time was dominated by the thought of Immanuel Kant. If one was not pursuing
a neo-Kantian project of some sort, then one was most likely part of a conversation
that was a response to Kant (say, Hegelian) or a response to a response to Kant (say,
Nietzschean, Marxist, or existential). These reactions tended to take the conversation
far afield when viewed from the perspective of a natural scientist, so those interested
in the foundations of physics tended to remain within the Kantian conversation.
For Kant, the central question of philosophy was “How is synthetic a priori
knowledge possible?”, in other words, all observation must be a combination of
sense data collected by the body with rational concepts provided by the mind. These
mental notions must exist before the observations as they are preconditions for even
the possibility of observing. We must take the raw sense data and put it through an
intellectual filter to create the complex observations we have. Since these intellectual
categories must come before observation, they cannot come from the world. But
since they provide us with non-tautological knowledge, they cannot be merely logical,
they must have content beyond their form. Where, then, could such knowledge come
from?
Kant argues that it must preexist within the human mind; it must be innate, a
standard part of the structure of the human consciousness. Included among these
beliefs, Kant contends, are Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics. They are
the psychological rules by which we construct the world we see in all its complexity
from the blur of colors our eyes feed into our minds. As such, they are not facts that
can be confirmed or falsified by observation as they are the very rules by which all
observations are created. Rather, they are undeniable truths about the structure of
our minds.
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Of course, both Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics are denied by the
general theory of relativity, a theory Einstein bases upon observation. In studying
the theory with Einstein, Reichenbach realizes that Einstein has not only overturned
the view we hold in terms of mathematics and physics, but in doing so Einstein
completely undermines the philosophical foundation that was generally accepted for
the basis of belief in the truth of these systems. In refuting Kant, we would now
need a new philosophy to go with the new physical worldview. But rather than tie it
to Einstein’s theory – the way Kant was tied to Newton and therefore would require
replacing when Einstein’s theory found its successor – Reichenbach aimed to create
a method that would be informed by our views of the world, but still allow us to
understand how to go about forming and justifying them.
This would be the goal of Reichenbach’s first book, The Theory of Relativity and A
Priori Knowledge, dedicated to and vetted by Einstein, and written immediately following
the seminar. In it, Reichenbach sketches out the fundamental axiomatic assertions of
Kant’s Newtonianism and those of the theory of relativity, showing how they are
incompatible and how the observational consequences of the two diverge, providing
support for those of Einstein. His introduction to the book begins:
Einstein’s theory of relativity has greatly affected the fundamental
principles of epistemology. It will not serve any purpose to deny this
fact or to pretend that the physical theory changed only the concepts
of physics while the philosophical truths remained inviolate. Even
though the theory of relativity concerns only relations of physical
measurability and physical magnitudes, it must be admitted that these
physical assertions contradict general philosophical principles. The
philosophical axioms, even in their critical [viz., Kantian] form, were
always formulated in such a way that they remained invariant with
respect to specific interpretations but definitely excluded certain
kinds of physical statements. Yet the theory of relativity selected
exactly those statements that had been regarded as inadmissible and
made them the guiding principles of its physical assumptions.23
Notice the way Reichenbach frames the discussion – “The philosophical axioms…
were always formulated in such a way that they remained invariant with respect to specific
interpretation.” Here, we have the notion of invariance invoked yet again, but in an
entirely new context. Where Cayley had used the notion to talk about the form of an
equation under a transformation of coordinates and Einstein used the concept with
respect to the reference frame of an observer, Reichenbach is now referring to the
invariance of the meaning of sentences under different interpretations.
This is no accident. Reichenbach’s new epistemological foundation inspired by
and accounting for the theory of relativity will hinge on the notion of coordination.
He makes clear that there is a difference between mathematical coordinates
[Koordinaten] and his notion of coordinating statements [Zuordnung], but the
words are both translated into English using the same notions of coordinating and
it is clear that Reichenbach is playing metaphorically on the similarity. Indeed, for a
coordination to be successful, he borrows the term uniqueness [Eindeutigkeit] that
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we saw in Einstein’s point-coincidence argument in his 1916 paper.24
Further, the eventual philosophical stance that emerges from the work of
Reichenbach and Moritz Schlick, a physicist trained under Max Planck turned
philosopher who was the first to work on the philosophical ramifications of the
theory of relativity25 and who was a correspondent with Einstein, would find its
central tenet in the point-coincidence argument. Logical Empiricism sought to
eliminate meaningless propositions from philosophical discourse by use of a criterion
of cognitive significance. This condition on the meaningfulness of propositions
would take various forms as a principle of verifiability. Einstein had realized that the
different formulations of the world with and without the hole were just different ways
of describing the same reality. In the same way, Reichenbach and Schlick would argue
that the meaning of a sentence is completely contained within the empirical content
of the sentence and therefore that any two sentences or theories that had the same
observable consequences were merely different ways of saying the same thing.26
The logical empiricists saw the job of philosophy to be quite different from its
previous inception. Philosophical discourse, they contended had become mired down
in meaningless chatter about pseudoquestions.27 It had become impressive sounding
nonsense. A question is a request for information. If there is such a fact to be found,
then it would be determinable either through mere logical analysis of the language
of the question in trivial cases or by checking the world, i.e., employing the means of
science, in non-trivial cases. If there was no such information, then the question was
not in fact a question, but nonsense, in other words, a pseudoquestion. Such it was,
they claimed, with much of traditional and contemporary philosophy. The work of
the philosopher, therefore, as they saw it was two fold: (i) to separate the meaningful
from the meaningless, the real questions from the pseudoquestions, and ship them
off to the physicist, biologist, psychologist, or whichever scientist was appropriate
to find the relevant fact, and (ii) to provide the logical foundations justifying the
methodologies of those scientific endeavors.
The deep attachment to science, mathematics, and logic amongst the logical
empiricists came not only from an embrace of the advances in science from Einstein,
mathematics from Klein, and logic from Bertrand Russell, but also from the times. In
the shadow of the horrors of World War I with its trench warfare, chemical weapons,
and mass death, the German speaking world became politically bifurcated with the
pro-nationalist conservatives blaming the modernist, Jewish, and scientific trends
for the ghastly results while the internationalist, pro-scientific left blamed the old
religious, monarchic structures for their militarism, rigidity, and superstition.28 The
logical empiricists saw the scientific community as a functioning human community
that fostered international cooperation and therefore a bulwark against war. Further,
science would be able to undermine the over-simplistic and false worldviews that riled
a population into such a frenzy that they could commit and condone the sorts of
atrocities seen in Europe during the Great War.29 Science and a worldview based on
and modeled after science could save humanity from itself they thought.
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Invariance in Gestalt Psychology
If the logical empiricists wanted to base all human belief and social structure on
science, then they needed a clear and complete understanding of how science worked.
An inextricable element of the scientific method is observation. Science provides
evidence based upon the actual sense experiences of the scientist. They needed to
understand the logical structure of inferences that took them from observations of
particular things, like reading the number on a meter, to universal truths and laws of
nature. But more basically, they also needed to understand how observation itself
worked.
One of Kant’s great insights, a realization that the logical empiricists cherished, is
that the naïve view of early empiricists like John Locke who held that the mind is initially
a tabula rasa written upon by observation could not possibly be correct. The world did
not simply leave impressions on our minds. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues
that there must be pre-existing mental structures to create the observations from the
raw sense data fed in through our senses. Observation is a combination of the world
sending messages through our sense organs and pre-established psychological means
within our minds to order and make sense of sensation. If the logical empiricists were
going to completely understand science, they would need to completely understand
the science that explained how observation worked, observation that stood at the
heart of science.
As it would happen, as Reichenbach was assembling a multi-disciplinary group of
intellectuals to embark on this project through coordinated presentations, university
seminars, and informal discussion groups, there was a group of psychologists at the
University of Berlin who were working on exactly the question of interest.
Gestalt psychology began in the late 1910s with Max Wertheimer’s work in
Frankfurt where he took two young students under his wing, Wolfgang Köhler and
Kurt Koffka. The three would be the founding figures in the Gestalt movement.
Wertheimer and Köhler took positions at Berlin after the war and while pursuing
work that would establish Gestalt doctrines as major advances in the history of
psychology, they also became active members in Reichenbach’s discussion groups.
They were well aware of the philosophical import of their work. In his address, “Über
Gestalttheorie” to the Kant Society in Berlin 1924, Wertheimer makes explicit that
Gestalt psychology is part of the larger movement of the times,
What is Gestalt theory and what does it intend? Gestalt theory was
the outcome of concrete investigations in psychology, logic, and
epistemology.30
The terms “logic” and “epistemology,” when used in Berlin in 1924 would clearly
point to Reichenbach.
The links between Reichenbach’s philosophical circle and the Gestalt community
were deep. Reichenbach was deeply impressed by Wertheimer’s works. Even though
Reichenbach had to flee Germany once the universities were purged in 1933 by
Hitler, taking a position for five years in Istanbul then ultimately ending up at UCLA,
Wertheimer’s books remained part of Reichenbach’s personal library until his death.
Kurt Lewin, widely held to be the founder of social psychology, was a contemporary
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of Reichenbach who would work on his Habitationschrift at Berlin when Reichenbach
was there taking Einstein’s seminar. The two would collaborate on work and Lewin
was the only person other than Einstein whom Reichenbach would show drafts of
his work in the foundations of physics.31 Lewin, in addition to Reichenbach’s student
Kurt Grelling32 would work in both the fields of philosophy of science and Gestalt
psychology in collaboration with Wertheimer, Köhler, and Koffka.
Köhler was widely celebrated as a teacher. His lectures would overflow their
venues. Yet, in spite of his renown and his own duties, at Reichenbach’s behest, it was
Köhler who took over supervision of Reichenbach’s doctoral students, most famously
Carl Gustav Hempel, after Reichenbach’s forced departure from Berlin.
The heart of the Gestalt theory was the Kantian idea that there were preexisting
structures in the mind needed to make sense of raw perception. What made Gestalt
theory unique was the claim that this only happened when the mind interpreted input
as a whole.
Is it really true that when I hear a melody I have a sum of individual
tones (pieces) which constitute the primary foundation of my
experience? Is not perhaps the reverse of this true? What I really have,
what I hear of each individual note, what I experience in each place
in the melody is a part which is itself determined by the character of
the whole. What is given me by the melody does not arise (through
the agency of any auxiliary factor) as a secondary process from the
sum of the pieces as such. Instead, what takes place in each single
part already depends upon what the whole is. The flesh and blood
of a tone depends from the start upon its role in the melody: a b as a
leading tone to cis something radically different from the b as a tonic.
It belongs to the flesh and blood of the things given in experience,
how, in what role, in what function they are in the whole.33
The mind does not create the whole from the part, but rather understands the part
only in terms of the whole, often supplying parts of the whole that may not actually
be experienced as in the famous Gestalt examples of incomplete shapes clearly seen.
When the Gestalt theorists write of this relation of part to whole, what term do
we find employed? “Invariance,” of course.
The Invariants. Therefore we shall discard the empiristic theory as an
ultimate explanation of our framework, without, however, raising
the claim that experience can have no effect at all upon it. Such a
claim would, in the present state of our knowledge, be unwarranted.
Having rid ourselves of the empiristic bias we find in our last
examples a very simple principle: such parts of the behavioral
environment as become part of our general spatial framework
assume one of the main spatial directions. Let us see what this
principle means in our examples. When we look through the window
of our mountain-railway carriage, this window becomes our spatial
framework and appears, therefore, in normal, horizontal-vertical
orientation. The contours of the objects seen through the window
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do not intersect with the sash at right angles. Therefore, if the sash is
seen as horizontal, these objects cannot be seen as vertical, but must
appear leaning away from us on the ascent, and towards us on the
descent. If Fig. 72 gives a somewhat exaggerated picture of the real
positions of the window and the telegraph pole, then it shows at the
same time why the telegraph pole cannot appear vertical when the
window becomes the framework and thereby horizontally-vertically
oriented. All one has to do is turn this picture until the lower side of
the window is horizontal; then of course the telegraph pole is tilted
to the right as much as in our drawing the window is tilted to the left.
The angle between the pole and the window sash, then, determines
the relative localization of the two objects with regard to each other,
whereas their absolute localization is determined by those parts
of the field which form the spatial framework. If one sticks one’s
head out of the window, the telegraph pole will soon look vertical;
when then, without losing sight of it, one withdraws the head, the
telegraph pole will still look vertical and the windows, the whole
carriage, tilted. One factor in these two situations is invariant, the
angle between ground and object…
We shall find the same principle, involving naturally other
invariants, operative in the field of colour and of movement as well:
relative properties of the stimulus distribution determining relative
properties of the objects and events in the behavioural world, but
the absolute properties of these latter depending upon a new factor,
which in our case of the spatial framework is the stress of this
framework towards the main directions of space.34
Koffka’s use of the notion of invariant as that which is real and establishes a
framework for truth beyond the relative is more than a little reminiscent of the pointcoincidence argument from Einstein and the notion of uniqueness in interpretation
from Reichenbach.
Koffka is careful to draw a distinction between the image on the retina and the
phenomenological or behavioural observation. We can have the same image on our
retina at different times and yet see different things. As he points out in the passage
above, the way the behavioural experience is created by a combination of the sense
organs and the mind will create relative truths, that is, truths that are experienced
relative to relative factors. But then there are invariant factors and these create
experiential truths that outrun particular frames of reference. This is precisely the sort
of invariance of interpretation suggested by Einstein’s 1916 theory of general relativity
and appropriated by Reichenbach as the central feature of his epistemology.
Through the relationships, both intellectually and personally, between the algebra
of Cayley, the geometry of Klein, the physics of Einstein, the interpretation of
Minkowski, the philosophy of Reichenbach, and the psychology of Wertheimer,
Köhler, and Koffka, we see the term “invariance” assume covariant senses in several
intellectual frames of reference. Yet, through it all, there is an invariance to “invariance,”
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a sense of the reality of the absolute, but an absolute that appears and can only be
completely understood in the particularity of its circumstances. Science is a human
endeavor and as in all other human occupations who you know will influence what
you know and what you do.
As Newton so rightly pointed out, standing on the shoulders of giants does not
diminish what one sees from their wonderful vantage point. One fascinating aspect of
the story of science, though, is that the pyramid of giants whose shoulders one stands
upon gets very wide at the base, thereby including giants one might not expect.
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